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ivAbstract
The study investigated the impact Nigeria’s government wage review of 1998 had on 
the differential in pay for public and private sector workers of the same educational 
qualifications and ages. Empirical analysis based on the Mincerian human capital model 
was carried out for urban male employees only (as they constitute a homogeneous group) 
in the public and private sectors. The results obtained show that before the wage review 
of 1998, public sector workers suffered a pay disadvantage of 6.78% while about one 
year after the review, public sector workers enjoyed a premium of 35.07%. In the absence 
of any wage reduction in the private sector, this result suggests that the implementation 
of the 1998 wage review succeeded in making public sector workers better remunerated 
than their private sector counterparts and it can be concluded that the wage increase in 
the public sector achieved its disguised goal of redressing the age-long poor pay in the 
sector.
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1.  Introduction 
T
he history of government wage review in Nigeria is as old as the history of the   
nation’s minimum wage. Minimum wage, which relate to some legal restrictions   
on the lowest wage rates payable by employers to their workers, have influenced 
wages in Nigeria since 1955, courtesy of the Wages Board Act of 1955. From 1955, 
successive governments have set minimum wages for all kinds of occupations/trades, 
especially the ones that can be considered formal. More often than not, whenever the 
minimum wage is set, it affects other levels of wages/salaries in Nigeria. In the past nine 
years, the federal government has formulated two directives/legislations that sought to 
increase the prevailing minimum wage and other levels of pay. The first became effective 
in September 1998. One aspect of this directive is that the minimum wage payable to 
workers in state government (and by extension, in formal private sector employment) 
should be N3000 (about US$35) per month, while that of workers in federal employment 
should be N3500 (about US$41).
The second directive on wages, which is an Act of Parliament, became effective on 
1 May 2000. The main provision of this Act is that the lowest paid worker in both the 
private sector (formal) and state governments should be N5,500 (about $55 then) every 
month. The lowest paid federal worker should receive a minimum wage of N7,500 
(about $75) per month. The objective of this law was to increase the nation’s minimum 
monthly wage by 83%. Higher levels of pay, especially in the public sector, were also 
supposed to register some increases in accordance with the existing pay structure which 
in most cases led to an increase of about 300% in the pay of higher level officers. The 
1998 wage review, however, was expected to lead to at least 726.45% increase in the 
nation’s minimum monthly pay, while the higher levels of pay in the public sector were 
supposed to increase in line with the public sector pay structure.
The first wage review in particular can be justified on the grounds that poor pay had 
prevailed for too long in the public sector. Public sector pay in Nigeria had stagnated 
since 1993 in spite of the rapidly increasing general price level (see Appendix 1). This 
had resulted in the public sector pay structure being inferior to that of the private sector. 
Such stagnation in the public sector pay might have been responsible, to some extent, 
for the brain drain that affected the public sector before the wage review in 19981. 
Some newspaper reports (The Guardian, 1999; The Punch, 1999, Nigerian Tribune, 
1999) indicate that a sizeable number of public sector employers (especially the state 
governments) did not comply in the first few months of the supposed implementation of 
the wage review, while the reactions (in terms of improved pay structure) of formal private 
sector employers to the new public sector pay structure remain unknown. The extent to 
which public sector employers complied with the requirements of the wage review would 2  re S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
definitely have implications for the supposed gap between public and private sector pay. 
In the same vein, the reactions of private sector employers would also have implications 
for the gap between public and private sector pay. Hence, the size of this gap should be 
of policy interest to those involved in addressing the poor public sector pay structure 
before the wage review. It was the examination of the nature of the gap between public 
and private sector pay in the post-1998 wage review period that constituted the main 
focus of this study. The study was also concerned with the extent of the wage gap that 
existed between the two sectors before the wage review in 1998 so as to provide some 
base results with which to assess the pay gap after the wage review.
The methodology adopted to determine the gap in pay was a comparison of predicted 
means of natural logarithm of earnings/pay of employees in the public and private sectors 
before and after implementation of the 1998 wage review. The predicted mean of natural 
logarithm of earnings of employees was derived from an estimated Mincerian human 
capital model for urban male employees in each sector. Observed differentials in the 
predicted means of the natural logarithm of earnings was then decomposed into the one 
due to background characteristics of workers and the one traceable to returns to those 
characteristics. An attempt was also made to explain labour market participation decision 
and sector selection of the whole labour force, which in this study was divided into six 
groups, namely: Private sector employees, public sector employees, self-employed, 
members of producer cooperative, employers of labour, and unpaid family labour and 
others (non-working).2 The results obtained showed that before the wage review of 
1998, public sector workers had a pay disadvantage of 6.78% while about one year after 
the wage review, public sector workers were already enjoying a premium of 35.07%. 
In the absence of any wage reduction in the private sector, this result suggests that the 
implementation of the 1998 wage review succeeded in making public sector workers 
better remunerated than their private sector counterparts. One can conclude that the wage 
increase in the public sector achieved its stealth goal of redressing the long-standing 
issue of poor pay in the sector.
Justification for the study
T
his study can be justified on several grounds. First, no empirical study on public– 
private wage differentials has been conducted recently for Nigeria. The absence of 
this sort of study and the lack of any reliable information on the pay differential might 
have bolstered the leverage of labour unions (of mainly public sector concerns) to 
pressure the government for pay increases, even after substantial increases were effected 
in the workers’ pay under the  Wage (Minimum) Act of 2000 in Nigeria. This study can 
provide some evidence on the public–private pay differential; such evidence can assist 
government in addressing wage policy problems in the public sector.
Another justification for this study stems from the fact that the last two wage 
reviews in the public sector were not hinged on productivity increases. These could 
engender price increases the more so since the public sector is the largest employer of 
non-agricultural salaried workers in Nigeria (as in other African countries; see Heller 
and Tait, 1984) whose consumption expenditure has a profound multiplier effect on the 
market for consumables. Previous wage increases in Nigeria were not accompanied by Go v e r n m e n t  Wa G e  re v i e W Po l i c y  a n d  Pu b l i c -Pr i v a t e  Se c t o r  Wa G e  di f f e r e n t i a l in niGeria 3
productivity increases and the increases resulted in upward trends in the price level (see 
Owoye, 1994). Before the public sector pay review in 1998, there were genuine feelings 
and arguments that public sector workers were poorly remunerated in comparison to 
private workers. Nevertheless, this study can serve as a guide to future wage increases 
in the public sector, especially by revealing whether the public sector wage review in 
1998 made public sector employees enjoy a wage advantage over their private sector 
counterparts who are, of course, assumed to be remunerated according to productivity.
This study can also be justified on the grounds that it could be of immense use to 
public sector policy makers concerned with redressing the poor state of public sector 
pay (in relation to private sector pay) in the period before September 1998. The study 
will show how far the wage review achieved the goal of bettering the lot of public sector 
employees whose pay had stagnated from 1993 to August 1998.3 
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2, examines the theory of 
public-private sector wage differentials. Section 3 reviews wage determination policies 
in Nigeria. A review of related studies is undertaken in Section 4. Discussions on 
the models adopted for the study are contained in Section 6, while the data on which 
empirical analysis is based are described in Section 5. Results of the participation and 
sector of employment models are discussed in Section 7, while Section 8 is devoted to 
the interpretation of estimated wage equations. The differentials in public and private 
sector pay are analysed in Section 9. The study findings and conclusions are summarized 
in Section 10.4  re S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
2.  Theory of public–private sector 
wage differentials
S
everal authors have provided explanations and reviews on why there may be   
differentials between public and private sector pay structures. Among them   
is Gunderson (1979). He observes that the central difference between the private 
and public sector wage determination process is that in the public sector the neo-classical 
profit constraint is usually jettisoned in favour of an ultimate political constraint. He 
explains that under such a condition the wages of public sector employees will invariably 
be dictated by their ability to compete with other interest groups when making decisions 
on the allocation of government fiscal resources and also by their ability to compete with 
taxpayers on the aspect of the magnitude of government budget.
Existing political forces influence public sector wages indirectly through institutional 
channels, which in the end determine the framework for the bargaining process 
(Gunderson, 1979). Among such institutional channels are matters relating to rights 
to organize, appropriate crisis/dispute settlement procedures, the allowable number of 
bargaining issues, civil service regulations, appropriate wage criteria, and comparable 
wage surveys. He explains further that public sector wages can also be affected by such 
aggregate policies as wage-price guidelines, intergovernmental transfers, and deliberate 
and stealth attempts/decisions to contain the growth of the public sector. All these kinds of 
policy have been used in Nigeria at different times in the past three decades to determine 
wages across the public and private sectors.
Theoretical literature on public–private wage differentials also touches on why the 
public sector often absorbs wage increases or retains costlier employees. Cousineau and 
Lacroix (1977) identify among such reasons/factors the taxation power and the borrowing 
ability of governments, which enable the public sector to absorb wage increases without 
considering or using cheaper substitutes or reducing public services/workers. In a country 
like Nigeria, it is the increased oil-based revenue that has prompted the government to 
absorb substantial wage increases since the oil boom era of the 1970s.
Preston (1986) highlights three reasons why public and private sector wage rates may 
differ. First, there may be lags in the adjustment of labour market and its sub-markets. 
Second, workers in the two sectors may be non-competing groups to a certain extent. 
The last reason is that the government sector is not subject to the same pressures as 
the private sector is subjected, especially those related to the impact of competition in 
bringing about some uniformity in the wage rates offered by private sector participants. 
He indicates that competition may prompt the public sector to pay above the going rate, 
and then reduce the number of people it employs or the sector may decide to pay less 
than the going rate and accept the consequences, a decline in the quality of its labour.
While the foregoing theoretical literature points out some facts that are characteristic 
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of Nigeria’s wage determination process, the literature fails to dwell on such issues as 
the roles played by poverty, populist government programmes and the cost of living. 
These additional issues have featured prominently in the determination of public and 
private sector wages in Nigeria.6  re S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
3.  Wage determination policies in 
Nigeria
S
everal criteria for fixing or determining wages and salaries have been identified   
in the literature. Among these are job evaluation (which is adjudged the most   
valuable way of fixing wages), government order (especially with regard to 
minimum wage), ability to pay (on the part of employers), cost of living, and collective 
bargaining (see Akinwale, 2000). Fapohunda (1979) stresses (among other factors) 
the impact of fluctuating labour market forces (demand and supply) in the setting of 
wages. Fapohunda explains further that in Nigeria, modern sector wages and salaries are 
determined and regulated by administrative decisions of government, wage commissions, 
and prices and income policies. In addition, the traditional (mainly rural and informal) 
and intermediate sector wages are influenced to a large extent by market forces and to 
a lesser extent by wage levels in government establishments.
The phenomenon of wage commissions in Nigeria to determine and regulate wage 
levels dates back to the colonial period. The colonial government encouraged collective 
bargaining with minimal government intervention and official recognition of trade unions 
as legal institutions. The same government never required employers to recognize or 
bargain collectively with unions (Fapohunda, 1979).
Government policy on minimum wage in particular (in Nigeria) can be traced to 
the Wages Board Act of 1955 whose philosophy was the colonial government’s official 
policy of collective bargaining. By the mid 1960s, the Nigerian government had set 
minimum wages on nine different occasions for such occupations as mining (Jos Mine 
field) and commercial agriculture (Benin Rubber Industry), and also for trades in Lagos. 
Although the official labour policy stressed collective bargaining, the colonial government 
disregarded this policy. Instead, the government always set up ad hoc commissions to 
consider bonuses or wage revisions during periods of labour discontent. A total of 13 of 
such commissions have been establishd to date. These commissions/committees are:
(1)  Bridges Committee of Inquiry 1941
(2)  Tudor Davis Commission 1945
(3)  Harragin Commission 1946
(4)  Miller Committee 1947
(5)  Gorsuch Commission 1955
(6)  Mbanefo Commission 1959/60
(7)  Morgan Commission 1963/64
(8)  Adebo Commission 1970/71
(9)  Udoji Commission 1972/74
(10)  Damachi Tripartite Committee 1990
(11)  19-Man Presidential Committee 2000
6Go v e r n m e n t  Wa G e  re v i e W Po l i c y  a n d  Pu b l i c -Pr i v a t e  Se c t o r  Wa G e  di f f e r e n t i a l in niGeria 7
(12)   Wages, Salaries and Emolument Relativity Panel 2004/2005
(13)  Consolidation of Public Sector Emolument Panel 2005/2006
Nearly all these commissions (with the exception of the last two)4 used changes in 
the cost of living indexes rather than productivity changes for granting/recommending 
some wage increases. This might be due to the prevailing inflationary pressures which 
often reduced the real income of workers to below what could afford them the basic 
necessities of life. One disturbing aftermath of the Udoji Commission in particular was 
the official backdating and subsequent implementation of the increase in wages and 
salaries (which ranged from 12% to 30%).5 This served in no small measure to boost the 
purchasing power of government workers in the 1970s before inflationary pressures later 
made nonsense of the wage awards. In Table 1, it is shown that the Udoji Commission’s 
recommendation gave rise to a minimum monthly pay of N60 (about US$100 then).
In 1977, the federal government established a Productivity, Income and Wages 
Analysis Agency (to collect and analyse statistics on wages, income and price changes 
in both the public and private sectors) as a permanent institution to substitute for 
the institutionalized culture of ad hoc wage commissions to resolve wage and salary 
problems. Nevertheless, wage review commissions/committees continue to feature in 
the government wage determination process.
During the civilian regime in 1981, the nation’s minimum wage was fixed at N125   
per month by an Act of Parliament. However, at the onset of the structural adjustment 
programme in late 1986, the government issued the National Minimum Wage 
(Amendment) Order which abridged the 1981 Minimum Wage Act by exempting persons 
or companies employing fewer than 500 workers and persons employed in agricultural 
projects from its provisions. This amendment was, however, rescinded on 24 April 1987 
owing to labour protests against it in major cities (Benin, Enugu, Ibadan, Kaduna, and 
Lagos) across the country.6
When a 15-month national economic emergency was declared on 1 October 1985 
against a background of lacklustre economic performance, deductions ranging from 2% 
to 15% from all incomes were effected at source and paid into the Economic Recovery 
Fund at the Central Bank of Nigeria. The incomes from which deductions were made 
included rents, dividends, and wages and salaries of workers in both the private and public 
sectors, including the armed forces. These deductions were part of the measures expected 
to reduce domestic absorption so that the long running macroeconomic imbalance (current 
account and fiscal deficits in particular) in the economy could be ameliorated. There 
was, however, a refund of the deductions made in respect of junior workers at the end 
of the economic emergency period.
The minimum wage was redefined in 1991 to embrace total emoluments and at the 
same time universal applicability of minimum wage to all public sector departments 
and government levels was discontinued. Each government department/level was 
advised to pay according to its ability. However, at the beginning of 1993 an increase 
of 45% was effected in public sector workers’ salaries. The increase was ostensibly 
meant to cushion the inflationary effects of the rapidly depreciating naira (against major 
international currencies) following the deregulation of the foreign exchange market on 
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By September 1998, the federal government had issued a directive to increase the 
prevailing minimum wage and other levels of wages (especially in the public sector) 
perhaps due to its concern for workers’ welfare. The implementation of the directive 
resulted in the increase of the nation’s minimum monthly wage from N363 to N3,000. In 
addition, the directive led to substantial increases in take-home pay of all other categories 
of employees in the public sector. The extent of increase in pay in the private sector 
in response to what obtained in the public sector is, however, unknown. Following an 
agitation for an increase in wages by the Nigeria Labour Congress in 2000, the federal 
government again increased the minimum monthly wage from N3,000 to N5,500 in 
May 2000, while other levels of pay in at least the public sector were also increased. 
The increases in public sector pay were based on the report of a 19-man presidential 
committee set up to advise on the wage problem. The legal backing for the increases 
was the Wage (Minimum) Act of 2000. The extent to which state governments complied 
with the minimum wage aspect of the Act differed from one to the other.8 This may have 
been due, to a large extent, to the financial strength (of individual states) which has been 
recognized since 1991 as a critical factor in public sector employers’ compliance with 
any wage directive from the federal government. In Nigeria, the federal government 
appears to play some sort of overriding role in labour matters.
Some of the policies of the Nigerian government in the past three decades in the area of 
minimum wage and other wages for workers in the country are highlighted in Table 1. 
Table 1: Some federal government policies on minimum wage and other wages 
from 1974 to 2000
Commission/Budget/Decree/Act  Recommendations  Effective 
Year
1. Udoji Commission (1972/1974)  *Awards ranged from 12% to 30%.  1974
    *Minimum wage of eq N=60 (US$100) per month.
    *Maximum wage of eq N=1,025 (US$1,708) 
2. Minimum Wage Act of 1981  *Minimum wage of eq N=125 (US$209)  1981
3. Minimum Wage (Amendments)   *Minimum wage of eq N=250 (US$31)  1991
    Decree 1990 
4  Federal Budget  (1993)  *45% across the board increase in 
      government workers’ salaries resulted 
      in the increase  of minimum wage from 
      N250 (US$11.4) per month to N363 (US$16.5)  1993
5. Government Directive on   *Minimum wage of eq N=3,500 (US$41)  September
   Wages (1998)   for federal workers*Minimum wage of    1998
     eq N=3,000 (US$35) for state government workers
6. Minimum Wage Act of 2000.  *Minimum wage of eq N=7,500 (US$75)   May 2000
     for federal workers*Minimum wage of 
     eq N=5,500 (US$55) state government 
     and private sector workers  .
Note: The dollar value was arrived at using the naira–dollar exchange rate prevailing at the corresponding 
period.     
Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance (1991); World Bank (1994); CBN (1998); The Guardian (2000).
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The minimum wage and other wages in the public sector registered a zero rate of 
increase from 1981 to 1990 perhaps as a result of the requirements of the economic 
reform programme (structural adjustment programme) that held sway during the period.9 
Furthermore, the period from 1993 to 1998 recorded no increase in public sector pay 
despite the rapidly rising price level that prevailed during the period (see Appendix 1).10 r e S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
4.  Literature review
I
n a review of the literature on the public–private sector wage differential in developing   
countries, van der Gaag et al. (1989) discern two general types of studies. One type   
compares average wages between the two groups of workers, either on an aggregate 
basis or stratified by qualification levels. The other, which is well rooted in human 
capital models, assesses variation in wages on the basis of individual characteristics (like 
education) or by job characteristics (occupation). Studies in the mould of the first type 
include those of Bennel (1981), Lindauer et al. (1988) and Heller and Tait (1984). Bennel 
(1981) in particular investigates earning differentials between public and private sectors 
in Africa with special reference to Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. All these studies and others 
of that hue involve comparisons of average wages and such exercises have been faulted 
as they do not systematically analyse the role of workers’ background characteristics in 
determining relative levels of remuneration (see van der Gaag, et al. 1989).
The work of Mincer (1958, 1974) and Becker (1964) on the human capital models 
of determining earnings constitutes the conceptual fulcrum for the other type of studies. 
The model often suggests that observed wage differences among individuals are brought 
about by a combined team of school and post-school investments (education, training 
and work experience) and a host of other socioeconomic factors like geographical 
location, marital status and nationality which are expected to be correlated with earnings. 
Examples of studies that have followed this approach to unravel wage differentials are 
those by van der Gaag et al. (1989), Oaxaca and Ransom (1993), Terrell (1993), Bedi 
(1998) and Filmer et al. (1998). Oaxaca and Ransom (1993) and Filmer et al. (1998), 
however, focus on World Bank staff.
In these studies, sector-wage equations are estimated and then used to decompose the 
observed wage gap into two parts. One part relates to differences due to characteristics 
of the respective groups of workers, while the other part relates to differences traceable 
to between group/sector differences in the returns to given individual characteristics. 
This second part is not attributed to productivity-enhancing background attributes and 
is often taken as a priori evidence to suggest that one sector (say, public) or the other 
room sector (private) workers are reaping economic rent or collecting a pay premium. 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of most of the studies is that they use cross 
section data, while a few have used panel data.
The findings of the various studies on developing countries have not been uniform, 
perhaps due to the pay structure that prevailed in the private and public sectors. Some 
studies (see, for example, Lindauer and Sabot, 1983; House, 1984; Terrell, 1993; 
Skyt-Neilsen and Rosholm, 2001; Bales and Rama, 2002; Filmer and Lindauer, 2002; 
Boudarbat, 2004; Hyder and Reilly, 2005) suggest that public sector workers earn varying 
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amounts of premium. Other studies (for example, Corbo and Stelcner, 1983; van der 
Gaag et al., 1989; Bedi, 1998) find that private sector workers enjoy a significant wage 
advantage over their public sector counterparts.
Yet studies like those of Mohan (1986), which was undertaken for Columbia, and Al-
Samarrai and Reilly (2005), conducted for Tanzania, conclude that there is no significant 
statistical difference in the wage structures between the public and private sector. Besides 
these three groups of studies (and their findings) there is yet another whose conclusions 
are mixed (for example, Psacharopoulos et al. 1987; Steier, 1987). The study by Steier 
(1987), conducted in Venezuela, finds that average public wages were higher than 
private wages at all educational levels except post-secondary in 1975, but in 1984 public 
wages were lower at all schooling levels. In addition, in 1975 schooling and experience 
were found to be higher for workers in the private sector, but in 1984 the returns were 
surprisingly the same in both the private and public sectors. In addition, public sector 
workers enjoyed a wage advantage in the neighbourhood of 17% but this had ended 
by 1984. These varying results at different times, especially the dramatic turn of events 
that characterized public sector wages, were due perhaps to the selective freezing of 
government workers’ wages (Steier, 1987).12 r e S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
5.  Empirical models
 
E
arlier studies that investigate public–private pay differentials adopted various   
models, most of which, in recent times, are based on the Mincerian human capital   
model.10 Another feature of some of these studies is the modelling of labour 
market participation and sector of employment determination; two basic approaches have 
featured in this modelling. These approaches are based on the probit and multinomial 
logit models. The probit model is suitable when the problem involved has two choices 
(of employment), while the multinomial logit is adjudged a better alternative whenever 
the choices involved are more than two.
The modelling of labour market participation and sector of employment determination 
is usually informed in part by the need to explain the factors determining individual 
household member’s participation in the employment sector in which he/she is identified. 
The modelling is also meant to make possible the estimation of a sector selection variable/
term which is used to correct sector selection bias in the equation explaining individual/
worker earnings.
In this study we employed the multinomial logit to model labour market participation 
and sector of employment determination. This was informed by the fact that an individual 
of working age in Nigeria may be found in any one of the six forms of labour market 
participation as obtainable in the Nigeria’s general household surveys. These forms of 
labour market participation are: Formal private sector employment (as employee); public 
sector employment (as employee); self-employment; employment creation (as employer); 
membership of producer cooperative; and unpaid family employment and others (most 
probably as unemployed as no income is earned). The focus of this study was on the first 
two forms of labour market participation. We used the last form (unpaid family labour 
and others) as the control group or base category in the multinomial logit model.
We used the Mincerian human capital model to explain individual earnings in each 
of the two formal sectors of employment (public and formal private). We noted that 
a familiar problem in this sort of model was sample selection bias. This often occurs 
when unobserved characteristics of an individual influence both the wage and the sector 
selection process. If these characteristics are correlated with the explanatory variables 
in the human capital model/equation, the estimated coefficients on the variables will be 
biased. To deal with this problem, if it exists, we calculate selectivity terms (lambda) from 
the predicted probabilities of employment for each individual in a sector.11 These terms 
are then included as an explanatory variable in the human capital equation as follows:
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LnWis = β0 + βkHis + βλ λis + eis     ( 1 )
where LnWis is natural logarithm of monthly earnings/wage of individual i, in sector s;
His are human capital and other background characteristics of worker i in sector s;
λis is the selection correction term for individual i in sector s;
eis   is error term of zero mean and constant variance; and,    
β0, βk and βl are parameters, where k ranges from 1 to n (that is n H variables).
Equation 1 is a Mincerian human capital equation that is expressed in a compact form 
for the two sectors of employment (public and formal private). In the equation, individual 
employee wage/earnings are explained by human capital variables (education and age). 
If βλ is statistically significant, there is selectivity bias. In addition, the sign taken by βλ 
is of special significance. If its sign is negative, it implies negative selection into the 
sector/form of employment in question. A positive sign denotes positive selection into 
the sector concerned.
In estimating a Mincerian earning function/equation that includes a selectivity term, 
a problem that borders on identification normally arises. To address this problem, it 
is advisable to exclude one or more variables that are used to identify λis in the sector 
allocation/choice decision from the earnings equation. In this study, we used home 
ownership variable, location variable (urban/rural) and demographic characteristics of 
individuals to identify the selection terms (λis) and excluded these variables from the 
Mincerian earning equation.1214 r e S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
  
6.  The data
T
wo data sets were used for the analysis in this study. The data sets were derived   
from the General Household Survey (GHS) of Nigeria. The GHS contains   
information on household (and their members) background characteristics, 
educational attainment and employment activities, among others. The Federal Office 
of Statistics in Nigeria regularly conducts the GHS and it runs from April (of one year) 
to March (of the following year). Data gathering is divided into four quarters. The 
survey is designed and executed to cover both the rural and urban areas in a nationally 
representative way.
In this study, we used the data for the second quarter of the 1998 GHS, and the third 
quarter of the 1999 GHS. The second quarter data of 1998 GHS covered July, August and 
September (1998). The third quarter 1999 GHS data were for October, November and 
December (1999). The GHS data on household background characteristics, educational 
attainment and employment activities were for the month preceding the month of survey. 
The second quarter data of the 1998 GHS thus related to the period immediately before 
the increase in the public sector wage in September 1998. The third quarter data of 1999 
GHS were gathered more than a year after the public sector wage review in 1998.
The two data sets were restricted to individuals whose ages ranged from 15 to 60. 
Such individuals were assumed to constitute the nation’s labour force. The retirement   
age in Nigeria is 60 for most public and formal private sector employment. Students 
within this age bracket (15 to 60) were, however, excluded. The relevant data in respect 
of individuals in each of the surveys are contained in two separate data files. One relates 
to the data on the household as a unit, while the other focuses on individual members 
of the household. The two were merged using Stata Version 8 (a statistical software and 
econometric software). This permits in particular the identification of individual’s location 
(urban/rural) and of whether the respondent/individual owns a home or not.
Next we describe how we derived the variables used in the models. In the two data 
sets, four educational levels (without education, primary, secondary and post-secondary) 
were identified. We represented each level with a dummy variable and identified each 
individual/worker with the highest level attained. We arrived at the years of schooling 
by assuming 0, 6, and 12 years as the learning periods respectively for those without 
education, with primary, and with secondary education. The number of years of 
schooling for those who had attained the post-secondary level was 16. There were no 
data on workers’ experience in either their current or previous jobs. We had to derive 
general experience for each of the employees by subtracting from their ages, the years 
of schooling and six years of pre-school age. We used information on secondary job 
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of individuals/workers as a proxy for their moonlighting activities. GHS recognizes 
six occupational groups to which individuals can belong: Professional, sales, services, 
agriculture, production and clerks.
Some descriptive statistics of variables that relate to the whole labour force both before 
and after public sector wage review in 1998 are presented in Table 2. The Table shows 
that that there were no significant differences in the household demographic variables, 
educational levels, and occupational groups during the more than one year-period in 
which stellar changes were registered in the public sector wage structure. These, of 
course, are not unexpected in view of the period involved.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of Nigeria’s labour force before and after public 
sector wage review in 1998 
           
  Before wage review  After wage review
  (N = 10,891)   (N = 11,773)
       
  Mean  Standard Dev.  Mean  Standard Dev.
           
Household demographic
and other variables
Age  37.56  11.70  37.44  11.87
Experience  26.80  13.76  26.66  13.85
Years of schooling    4.79    5.34    4.80    5.38
Gender (Male = 1)    0.64    0.48    0.62    0.49
Marital status (Married = 1)    0.73    0.44    0.73    0.44
Household size    1.80    1.54    1.79    1.44
Own home    0.69    0.46    0.71    0.46
Household head       0.61    0.49    0.59    0.49
Urban/rural (Urban = 1)    0.26    0.44    0.26    0.44
Moonlighting    0.08    0.26    0.07    0.25
Monthly income/earnings
 (in 1985 prices)      N67.39     87.40            N102.60               
350.62
Educational levels
No education    0.49    0.50    0.49    0.50
Primary education    0.25    0.44    0.25    0.43
Secondary education    0.21    0.41    0.21    0.40
Post-secondary education    0.05    0.21    0.05    0.22
Occupational groups
Professional    0.06    0.24    0.06    0.24
Sales    0.22    0.41    0.21    0.41
Services    0.01    0.11    0.01    0.12
Agriculture    0.60    0.49    0.60    0.49
Production    0.06    0.24    0.08    0.27
Clerks    0.05    0.21    0.04      0 . 1 9  
           
Source:   Computations by the author from the Nigeria General Household Survey (2nd quarter data of 1998 
and 3rd quarter data of 1999). The survey was conducted by the Federal Office of Statistics (now renamed 
the National Bureau of Statistics), Lagos, Nigeria.
 
At least 49% of Nigeria’s labour force lacked the lowest educational level (primary); 
this is corroborated by the low average years of schooling which was less than the years 
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was the dominance of male labour, accounting for between 62% and 64% of the nation’s 
labour force. Urban dwellers accounted for 26% of the labour force, while at least 60% 
of the nation labour force was employed in agriculture (which is rural-based). The next 
important occupation in Nigeria is sales, which embraces all activities that have to do 
with buying and selling. Between 7% and 8% of the labour force reported moonlighting 
activities. This probably constituted incomplete reporting, as many employed Nigerians 
do engage in work besides their primary occupation.
Of special significance in the statistics presented in Table 2, was the dramatic change 
that characterized the average income of the labour force after the public sector wage 
review in 1998. This was, however, accompanied by a higher dispersion in income 
distribution (from N87.40 to N350.62) thereby suggesting an increased level of income 
inequality in the country. There is no doubt that the wage review might have played a 
significant role in the stellar change (of 51.80%) registered in the average income (in 
1985 prices) of the labour force during the period under review. This is more so as the 
economy was undergoing a slowdown on account of the drastic reduction in oil export 
revenue, traceable to the meltdown in the East Asian economies during the same period. 
Available statistical evidence shows that a reduction of about 28% was registered in oil 
export revenue in the 1998 fiscal year alone.13 Oil exports account for more than 90% 
of Nigeria’s export earnings.
Other developments in the economy during the period still allude to the fact that 
the public sector wage must have played some decisive role in the impressive growth 
recorded in the average income/earnings of the nation’s labour force. A tight monetary 
policy coupled with good harvests during 1999 resulted in a single-digit inflation rate 
of 6.6% (CBN, 1999). Moreover, the gross domestic output grew by 2.7% against the 
minimum target of 3.0% (CBN, 1999).
Further developments in 1999 relate to the observed stability in the interest and 
exchange rates which also contributed to the relative macroeconomic stability during the 
period. Labour unemployment, as measured by composite unemployment rate, was at 
a level of 3.3% in June 1999 compared with 3.9% in the corresponding period in 1998. 
However, industrial relations were strained during the year, as the number of trade disputes 
declared increased from 16 in 1998 to 52 (in 1999). Out of the 52, about 37 gave rise to 
work stoppages. The upsurge in trade disputes was mainly due to disputes between most 
state governments and civil servants over the implementation of the requirements of the 
new public sector pay review. The increase in public sector pay must have contributed 
to the dramatic increase in the labour force average monthly income/earnings, as these 
other developments in the economy could not have led to such a large increase in the 
nation’s average monthly income/earnings.
Since the analysis of public-private wage differential in this study was based on urban 
male employees in both the public and private sectors, we presented the descriptive 
statistics and the distribution of monthly income/earnings for this cohort of employees 
by decile for the two sectors in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. The focus on urban male 
employees was informed, first, by the fact that they constitute a homogeneous group. 
Another reason was that similar studies on developing countries have used mostly 
samples of male employees14 and we hoped our choice of male sample (though only 
urban) could provide some basis for comparing our results with those of other studies 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of urban male employees before and after public 
sector wage review in 1998         
       
  Before wage review  After wage review
       
  Private sector  Public sector  Private sector  P u b l i c 
sector
       
Sample size  234  267  153  347
       
  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std. 
    Dev.    Dev.    Dev.    Dev. 
       
Household demographic
and other variables
Age  38.01    9.46    37.98    8.63    37.81     9.64    40.75     
8.82
Experience  20.95  10.94    20.20  10.04    22.11   11.02    22.95   
10.44
Years of schooling  11.09    4.45    11.78    4.22      9.71     4.99    11.80     
4.78
Marital status (Married =1)      0.69    0.46      0.73    0.44      0.70     0.46      0.80     
0.40
Household size    1.22    0.94      1.15    0.80      1.25     0.95      1.08     
0.62
Own home    0.17    0.38      0.27    0.44      0.19     0.39      0.25     
0.43
Household head   0.92    0.27      0.94    0.23      0.90     0.29      0.97     
0.17
Moonlighting    0.06    0.24      0.04    0.20      0.01     0.80      0.01     
0.12
Monthly income (in 1985
Prices)
 N 142.41  185.22  N112.95  90.57 N175.29 103.08  N255.36 326.84
Educational levels
No education  0.05    0.23     0.06   0.23     0.12     0.33      0.08     
0.27
Primary education  0.23    0.42     0.13   0.34     0.25     0.44      0.14     
0.34
Secondary education   0.44    0.50     0.50   0.50     0.44     0.50      0.39     
0.49
Post-Secondary education   0.28    0.45     0.31   0.46     0.18     0.39      0.39   
0.49
       
Where Std. Dev. refers to Standard Deviation.
Source: Computations by the author from the Nigeria General Household Survey (2nd quarter data of 1998 
and 3rd quarter data of 1999). The survey was conducted by the Federal Office of Statistics (now renamed 
the National Bureau of Statistics), Lagos, Nigeria.
The information in Table 3 shows that the average age of private sector urban male 
employees during the period was similar to that of public sector urban male employees. 
The average years of experience of the two groups of employees were also similar. This 
can be explained by the closeness of their average ages. However, public sector employees 
had a higher number of years of schooling than their private sector counterparts and 
this is understable since the percentage of public sector employees with secondary and 
post-secondary education was higher than that of private sector employees.18 r e S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
More public sector employees owned their houses than did private sector employees. 
The higher percentage of public sector workers who were homeowners may be explained 
by the various housing schemes implemented for public sector employees before the 
structural adjustment policies put an end to the practice. The percentage of public sector 
employees who were household heads was higher perhaps due to the higher percentage 
that were married. The percentages of employees engaged in secondary job activities 
(moonlighting) were lower after the public sector wage review in 1998. This may be 
attributed to the upward review in public sector wages with its positive spillover effects 
in the private sector. Since the wage review bolstered the real income of employees in 
the two sectors, it is most likely that engaging in secondary job activities became less 
attractive. It then follows that some additional hours might have been allocated to leisure 
after the wage review.
The average monthly income (in 1985 prices) of public sector employees increased 
by about N140 after the wage review while that of private sector employees increased 
by N32.88. These increases were accompanied by higher variability (as measured by 
standard variation) in public sector wages and lower variability in private sector wages. 
The distribution of income (of the two cohorts of employees) by decile before and after 
the public sector wage review in 1998 is presented in Table 4.
Table 4:  Distribution of urban male employees’ monthly income (in 1985 prices) 
by decile before and after public sector wage review in 1998
  Before wage review  After wage 
review 
  Private sector  Public sector  Private sector  P u b l i c 
sector
Sample size  234  267  153  347        
Decile  N  N  N  N
10  45.97  45.97  74.54  106.93
20  61.29  55.16  91.65  128.91
30  76.61  64.35  122.20  152.75
40  91.93  76.61  137.48  177.19                                                 
50  107.25  91.93  152.75  195.52
60  122.58  107.25  183.30  229.13
70  153.22  122.58  204.69  259.68 
80  183.86  153.22  229.13  324.44
90  228.30  203.16  293.28  458.25
100  1109.75  919.31  672.10  1374.76
Source: Computations by the author from the Nigeria General Household Survey (2nd quarter data of 1998  
and 3rd quarter data of 1999). The survey was conducted by the Federal Office of Statistics (now renamed 
the National Bureau of Statistics), Lagos, Nigeria.
As shown in Table 4, before the public sector wage increase in September 1998, the 
private sector wage profile (in 1985 prices) for urban male employees was better than 
that of the public sector (for virtually all the deciles). This perhaps provides some reason 
behind the brain drain (of mainly highly skilled labour) from the public to private sector 
before 1998.15 The poor public sector pay profile (before September 1998) can be blamed 
on the stagnation that characterized salaries from 1993 to August 1998 on account of the Go v e r n m e n t  Wa G e  re v i e W Po l i c y  a n d  Pu b l i c -Pr i v a t e  Se c t o r  Wa G e  di f f e r e n t i a l in niGeria  19
Federal Government policy to contain the growth of public sector pay. More than a year 
after the pay review, public sector pay (in 1985 prices) for every decile was higher than 
that of the private sector. The pay advantage can, of course, be traced in large measure 
to the implementation of the requirements of the public sector pay review, at least in the 
public sector, where the review was much publicized and fought for by the various public 
sector labour unions. The case for the implementation of the pay review was pursued 
vigorously by the militant central labour union, Nigeria Labour Congress.
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7.  Participation and sector of 
employment
T
he results of the estimated multinomial logit models are presented in Table 5.   
The dependent variable in each of the models was represented by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or   
0 if the individual (member of the household) concerned is respectively a private 
sector employee, public sector employee, own account worker, producer cooperative 
member, employer of labour or unemployed/unpaid family worker. Among the 
explanatory variables considered were marital status and household headship, which were 
expected to capture the responsibility associated with marriage and being a household 
head respectively. The responsibility was assumed to influence an individual’s decision 
to participate in the labour market segments positively.
Another explanatory variable was household size, which could represent both obligation 
and resources. In case of obligation, one would expect it to influence participation 
positively but negatively in case the variable functions more as an indicator of resources. 
Yet another variable considered, which also serves as an indicator of resources was home 
ownership (own home) which should negatively influence participation. The decision to 
participate (especially as an employee in either the private or public sector organization) 
would be positively affected by the level of schooling. Being an urban dweller was 
expected to influence the decision to participate positively in the formal labour market 
sectors, which are common in the urban areas. The variable for this was named urban/
rural. Being young was expected to increase an individual’s probability of participation 
in the various labour market sectors. This could be explained by an individual’s age while 
participation was expected to decline with age. This was measured by the age squared 
variable in the multinomial logit models.
In order to verify whether the sectoral decomposition of the nation’s labour market 
adopted for the multinomial logit models was justified, I conducted Wald tests of the 
equality of the slope parameter vectors associated with various employment choices. 
The null hypothesis was rejected at 0.000 level of significance. The same level of 
significance and decision characterized the null hypothesis with regard to the equality 
of schooling effects, which were represented in the models by primary, secondary and 
post-secondary education. The results of these tests show that Nigeria’s labour market is 
indeed not homogeneous and so the sectoral decomposition adopted was justified, as the 
determinants of entry into the different sectors of the labour market were not the same. 
The results presented in Table 5 are interpreted in the next section. These results relate 
to multinomial logit models for explaining the determinants of entry into the different 
sectors of the labour market in the periods before and after public sector wage review in 
1998. The coefficients reported are odd ratios, which are the exponentiated coefficients 
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Table 5 Continued
  Private sector   Public sector   O w n 
account    Producer coop   Employers
  employees  e m p l o y e e s  
workers   members  of labour
  Before  After  Before  After  Before 
After  Before  After  Before  After
Sample size  546  340  636   827   7433 
8290   1954  1201  80  69
Percentage (%)  5.01  2.89  5.84  7.02  68.25 
70.42  17.94  10.20   0.73    0.59
Variables:
Secon. education  1.86**  21.48***  5.35***  66.67***  0.34*** 
3.71***  0.13***  1.40***  0.79   17.18***
  (2.42)  (13.20)  (5.96)   (19.74)  (-5.10) 
(10.52)  (-9.22)  (2.62)  (-0.60)  (6.07)
Post-Sec. education   2.22**  105.14***  7.57***  562.82***  0.05*** 
3.49***   0.02***   0.83  0.57  273.95***
  (2.41)  (10.39)  (5.81)  (14.67)  (-9.81) 
(3.12)  (-7.99)  (0.35)  (1.18)  (9.76)
Sample size: Before = 10,891, After = 11,773, LR chi2 (55): Before = 8711.55, After =8685.75, Prob>chi2: 
Before = 0.0000, After = 0.0000,
Pseudo R2 : Before = 0.3977, After = 0.3638, Log Likelihood: Before = -6595.8709, After = -7594.6833.
Note:   The variables’ coefficients are odd ratios, which are referred to as relative risk ratios (rrr) in Stata 
program. The figures in brackets are z-statistics.
  *** 1% level of significance.
  **   5% level of significance.
  *     10% level of significance.
  “Secon.” means secondary while “Post-Sec.” means post-secondary.
  The control group or base category is made up of unemployed and unpaid family members.
Source: Estimations based on the Nigeria General Household Survey data for second quarter (July, August 
and September), 1998 and for third quarter (October, November and December) 1999.
Results in Table 5 show that the underlying coefficients of the odds ratios attached 
to household head and marital status had the right signs and they were significant across 
the various labour market segments (except the negative but significant coefficient sign 
for household head in the case of producer cooperative members) in the periods before 
and after the increase in public sector wage.16 The odds in favour of household heads 
increased across the labour market segments after the public sector wage review. The 
highest odds of 67.84 were registered with regard to public sector employment for 
household heads after the wage review. This shows that household heads were 67.84 
times more likely to be employees in the public sector (relative to being unemployed or 
unpaid family workers) than household members who were not heads. The next labour 
market segment in which household heads are more likely to be found following the wage 
review is the one populated by own account workers. Household heads were 0.04 times 
less likely to be engaged as producer cooperative members after the wage review. The 
odds (in favour) of household heads to be private sector employees increased by 5.09 
times before wage review while odds increased by 42.86 times after wage review.
The levels of odds (in favour) of marital status declined across labour market segments 
after public sector wage review. The highest odds of 2.01 characterized the own account Go v e r n m e n t  Wa G e  re v i e W Po l i c y  a n d  Pu b l i c -Pr i v a t e  Se c t o r  Wa G e  di f f e r e n t i a l in niGeria  23
workers’ segment after the wage review. This implies that married members of households 
were 2.01 times more likely to be own account workers (relative to being unemployed 
or unpaid family workers) than household members who were not married. After the 
public sector wage review, married household members were 1.70 times (compared with 
3.22 times before wage review) more likely to be public sector workers (relative to being 
unemployed or unpaid family workers) while the same cohort of household members 
was 1.28 times more likely to be private sector employees (relative to being unemployed 
or unpaid family workers) than household members outside the cohort.
The odds in favour of male members of household to be engaged in the various labour 
market segments increased after the wage review perhaps due to increased returns to 
efforts. The only exception was the “Employers of labour” segment whose underlying 
coefficient was not significant. All this may be partly traced to the small sample size that 
characterizes the segment both before and after the wage review. The odds in favour 
of household male members being private sector employees increased from 0.62 times 
before wage review to 1.69 times after the wage review while the case of the same 
genre of household members being engaged as public sector employees increased from 
0.60 times before wage review to 1.08 times after the wage review. The odds against 
employment prospects of household members for every increase in household size 
(in the various sectors of labour market) increased by a small margin (of less than 1) 
after the wage review.17 The same marginal increase was apparent in the odds against 
household members with their own homes being engaged in the various segments of the 
labour market after the wage review. These results suggest that the public sector wage 
review in 1998 bolstered the income earning prospects and the effective participation 
of the concerned household members across the five segments of the Nigerian labour 
market. The results in respect of household members with their own homes indicated 
that such an asset holding should ordinarily increase the odds against participation in 
the various labour market segments substantially both before and after any public sector 
wage review.
The coefficients attached to age variables (age and age squared) had the right signs 
and were significant in most cases. With regard to age, the levels of odds in favour of 
participation across the five labour market segments registered some increases after wage 
review. For every additional year of age, the odds (in favour) of household members 
participating as private sector employees increased by 1.28 times before wage review 
while the odds increased by 1.31 times after wage review. However, the odds (in favour) 
of household members being employed as public sector employees increased by 1.43 
times before wage review while the odds increased by 1.48 times after wage review. 
For every additional year of age, the odds of household members entering the labour 
market as own account workers increased by 1.21 times before wage review while the 
odds increased by 1.25 times after wage review. Each additional year of age would 
result in the odds of household members being employers of labour increasing by 1.22 
times and 1.38 times before and after wage review respectively. The results in respect 
of age-squared were such that the odds against old household members being involved 
in the various segments of the labour market range from 0.65 to 0.97 times during the 
periods before and after wage review.
The coefficients of urban/rural variable were significant in most labour market 24 r e S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
segments with negative odds predominating in the period before wage review. The 
negative odds were implied by the negative sign of the underlying coefficients. This, 
of course, means that the odds are against household members (that are based in urban 
areas) in securing employment opportunities in the various segments of the labour market 
before wage review. However, the odds against were less than 1 in all the cases while 
the odds in favour after wage review were greater than 1, ranging from 1.03 to 6.49.
The levels of odds attached to education variables across labour market segments 
were higher after wage review and their underlying coefficients (both before and after 
wage review) were significant in most cases from 5% to 10% (level of significance). For 
household members with primary education, the highest odds (in favour) before and after 
wage review occurred in the labour market segment made up of public sector employees. 
This suggests that the least educated were selected into that segment of Nigeria’s labour 
market where they were better remunerated perhaps under the public sector-mandated 
minimum wage. Again the highest odds (in favour) of household members that had 
either secondary or post-secondary education were associated with being employed 
as public sector employees both before and after wage review. The lowest odds were 
common with the segment populated by producer cooperative members both before 
and after wage review. This can be explained by the fact that the job involved under 
producer cooperative arrangement, which is rural-based and agricultural-related, does 
not require much education.
The increases in the levels of odds in favour of and the marginal increases in the 
odds against household members being selected into the various segments of the nation’s 
labour market after the wage review suggest that the review must have played some role 
in the absence of any other fundamental changes in the labour market. Hence, the wage 
review had some decisive effects on the household members’ participation decisions in 
the various segments of the Nigeria labour market.
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8.  Estimated wage equations
T
he results of the estimated wage equations are presented in Tables 6 and 7. The   
explanatory variables considered were age, age squared and educational levels   
of urban male household members employed as private and public sector 
employees. The dependent variable was the natural logarithm of monthly wages/salaries. 
In Nigeria, private and public sector employees are in most cases remunerated monthly. 
Age as a variable was meant to capture returns to experience while age squared is 
introduced to measure the often observed parabolic decline in earnings with age.
Table 6:  Estimated log-monthly wage equations for urban male employees
                                            Before wage review                      After wage review
  Private sector  Public sector  Private sector  Public sector
Constant  1.2515***      1.4022***       3.3943***  3.3703***
   (4.61)      (5.65)   (6.29)  (5.62)
  
Age           0.0302**       0.0107  0.0671**  0.0728***
   (2.19)       (0.83)                (2.44)  (2.50)
  
Age2/100   -0.0298*       -0.0044   -0.0740**  -0.0757**
   (-1.65)       (-0.27)                  (-2.15)  (-2.15)
  
Primary education            -0.0103        0.1862**   -0.0177   0.0054
  (-0.12)        (2.40)                  (-0.13)   (0.04)
  
Secondary education  0.0686        0.2061***    0.1292   0.1610
    (0.86)        (2.99)   (1.03)   (1.31)
  
Post Sec. education              0.2122***       0.3103***   0.8177***    0.5609***
   (2.59)         (4.36)   (5.71)   (4.65) 
  
Sample Size   234          267    153   347
F Statistic   8.51          7.55    15.84   14.92
Prob>F     0.00          0.00    0.00    0.00
Adjusted R2       0.14          0.11    0.33    0.17                         
Note that the figures in brackets are t-statistics of the corresponding coefficients.
Where *** implies 1% level of significance.
              **  implies 5% level of significance.
                *  implies 10% level of significance.
Source: Estimations based on the Nigeria General Household Survey data for 2nd quarter (July, August and 
September) 1998 and for third quarter (October, November and December) 1999.26 r e S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
Three educational variables were included in the model. These were primary 
education, secondary education and post-secondary education. The coefficients attached 
to these levels of education were expected to be positive and to increase according to the 
levels attained by the employees. The coefficients attached to age and age-squared were 
expected to be positive and negative respectively. The results in Table 6 specifically relate 
to the estimated equations of logarithm of monthly wage of urban male employees in the 
private and public sectors. The explanatory powers of the estimated equations (with and 
without selectivity correction terms) in terms of adjusted R2 ranged from 11.0% to 35%. 
This range is plausible in light of the ranges of adjusted R2 found in similar empirical 
studies that use cross-sectional data. The entire slope coefficients of each of the equations 
were highly significant as indicated by the F statistics and its significance levels.
Yearly returns to experience were on the low side across sectors. They were, however, 
within the range reported in Hofmeyr (2002) for South Africa, and Glick and Sahn 
(1997) for Guinea (French-speaking, West African country). Age-squared had the right 
negative sign and was also significant across sectors (except in the public sector before 
wage review). 
The results in Table 6 show that other variables have the right signs except the primary 
education variable in the periods before and after wage review for the private sector. 
Some of the variables were statistically significant at any level from 1% to 10%. Before 
the wage review in 1998, the returns to experience (age) in the private sector were more 
than double those registered in the public sector though the coefficient attached to the 
experience variable in the public sector was not significant. This seems to provide some 
explanation for the brain drain witnessed in the public sector before the wage review 
in September 1998. The coefficient attached to age-squared shows that the decrease 
in earnings (as an employee becomes old) was higher in the private sector than in the 
public sector in the period before the wage review. This may be explained by the better 
pension and retirement benefits in the Nigerian public sector.
Before and after the wage review, the returns to schooling increased with the level 
of education attained by urban male employees. This finding agrees with those of van 
der Gaag and Vijverberg (1989), Glick and Sahn (1997) and Nielsen and Westergard-
Nielsen (2001). However, the result contradicts that of Psacharapoulos (1994), whose 
study seeks to provide comprehensive update of the profitability of investment in 
education at a global scale. In the present study, the primary education variable in the 
private sector that is wrongly signed is not significant at any level from 1% to 10%.18 
Before the wage increase, the returns to educational levels were higher in the public 
sector than in the private sector despite the zero increase in public sector wage from 
1993 to August 1998.
After the wage review, the returns to experience for urban male employees became 
higher in the public sector than in the private sector while the reduction in earnings 
as employees grew older was slightly larger in the public than in the private sector. 
The returns to post-secondary schooling became higher in the private sector while the 
returns to secondary education were higher in the public sector perhaps due to the wage 
review. This suggests that the wage review succeeded in bettering the lot of public 
sector employees with secondary education while public sector employees with post-
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sector counterparts.19 However, the coefficients attached to education variables besides 
post-secondary education were not significant at reasonable levels in the public sector 
wage equation. The results of estimating the wage equations while correcting for sector 
selection bias, which is captured by a variable named lambda, are presented in Table 7.
Table 7:  Selectivity-corrected log-monthly wage equations for urban male 
employees 
                                            Before wage review                      After wage review
  Private sector  Public sector  Private sector  Public sector
Constant  1.1164*    2.2332***  2.1963***  -9.0778 
         
  (1.94)  (3.26)            (2.53)  (-1.25)
  
Age          0.0297**  0.00002  0.0371      0.0514
  (2.12)  (0.00)  (1.15)  (1.63)
  
Age2/100  -0.290  -0.0086  -0.0407  -0.0544
  (-1.59)  (-0.45)  (-1.04)  (-1.46)
  
Primary education  -0.0056  0.1692**  -0.0642  0.0292
  (-0.07)  (2.15)  (-0.47)  (0.21)
  
Secondary education  0.0798  0.1248  0.0693  0.2202*
  (0.88)  (1.34)  (0.54)  (1.73)
  
Post Sec. education  0.2397*    0.1027  0.7794***  0.6840***
  (1.82)  (0.59)  (5.41)  (4.89)
  
Lambda  0.1905     -0.7986  2.3699*  31.7805*
       (0.27)  (-1.30)  (1.75)  (1.72)   
  
Sample size   234        267     153  347
F-statistic   7.08  6.59  13.90  13.00   
Prob>F   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Adjusted R2        0.14  0.11            0.34  0.17
Note that the figures in brackets are t-statistics of the corresponding coefficients.
Where *** implies 1% level of significance.
              **  implies 5% level of significance.
                * implies 10% level of significance.
Source: Estimations based on the Nigeria General Household Survey data for 2nd quarter (July, August and 
September) 1998 and for third quarter (October, November and December) 1999.
The results in Table 7 show that the sector selection variable (lambda) is only 
significant in determining wages in the two sectors in the period after the wage review. 
Of particular interest is the higher size of the coefficient attached to the selection variable 
in the public sector wage equation (after the wage review), which further explains the 
higher relative risk ratios attached to participation of household members with any of 
the educational levels after the wage review (see Table 5). The negative sign of lambda 
(though not significant) in the public sector wage before the wage review suggests that 
there was negative selection of employees into the public sector. This seems to confirm 
what really happened in the sector during the period of stagnation in public sector pay, as 
the phenomenon of brain drain from the public sector assumed a topical and disturbing 
dimension. The positive sign (though not statistically significant) of the sector selection 
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that there was positive selection of employees into the private sector which may be 
expected, as there is evidence of brain drain from the public sector to the private sector. 
The positive sign assumed by the selectivity term in the period after the wage review 
suggests that there is positive selection into the two sectors perhaps due to the better public 
sector pay profiles and the spillover effects of the pay review in the public sector.
Following the introduction of the selectivity term, the returns to educational levels 
were moderated upward in the private sector wage equation while the returns to 
educational levels were moderated downward in the public sector wage equation before 
the wage review. However, in the period after wage review, the results were the opposite. 
While age variables had the right signs, it was only in one of the eight cases that there 
was statistical significance. On the whole, the sector selection term was only relevant 
for this analysis (of pay differentials) in the period after the wage review in 1998, as the 
statistical significance of the term conferred some measure of reliability on the estimated 
coefficients of the equations.
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9.  Public–private wage differentials and 
their decompositions
A
nalyses of the pay differentials are contained in Table 8. Two sets of estimated   
wage equations feature in the analyses of the pay differential. These are the   
equations with and without the selectivity term. Estimated wage equations 
are used without the selectivity term in the period before the wage review while wage 
equations with the selectivity term are used in the period after the wage review to 
decompose wage differentials between the two segments of the labour market. As shown 
in Table 8, there are differences in the predicted means of natural logarithm of earnings 
of employees in the two sectors. 
 
Table 8:  Public–private wage differential for the periods before and after the wage 
review in 1998
  Before wage   After wage 
  review  review
Mean ln monthly wage—private sector  2.0316  5 . 0 0 7 6  
Mean ln monthly wage—public sector  1.9660  5 . 3 0 8 2  
Overall ln wage differential  0.0656  0.3006
Antilog of (ln) wage differential  1.0678   
1.3507
Contribution of employees’ characteristics  -0.01648  -0.0308
Contribution of returns to characteristics20   0.08208  0.3314
Percentage contribution of characteristics   -25%  -10.25%
Percentage contribution of returns  125%  110.25%
Source: Computations from descriptive statistics of urban male employees and estimated wage equations.
The predicted mean of the natural logarithm of earnings of employees in the private 
sector was higher than that of the employees in the public sector before the wage review 
in 1998 (Table 8). However, the opposite situation prevailed after the wage review. The 
predicted means of natural logarithm of earnings in the sectors for the two periods are 
in line with the descriptive statistics (mean of monthly income) and the distribution of 
monthly income of urban male employees by decile presented earlier in this paper.
A much more meaningful description of the differential in the means of natural log 
earnings can be obtained by taking the antilog of the differential. This is carried out for 
each period in Table 8. For the period before the wage review in 1998, the antilog shows 
that public sector urban male employees suffered a pay disadvantage of 6.78% while the 
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1998. The pay disadvantage in the public sector before the wage review can be traced 
to a great extent to the stagnation that characterized the public sector pay structure from 
1993 to August 1998. The pay disadvantage might have been responsible to a great extent 
for the brain drain observed by Ojo (1998) in the public sector before 1998.
The differential in predicted means of logarithm of earnings in similar studies is usually 
decomposed into two parts. One part is the differential traceable to differences in mean 
employee’s characteristics while the other part is taken to be due to differences in the 
returns to those characteristics. The latter differential is taken as evidence of economic 
rent. Empirically, the first part is due to differences in the average levels of education, 
experience, and other covariates (that is, other explanatory variables). The second part 
of the differential is derivable from the differences in the coefficients (both intercept and 
slopes) in the earnings equations.21 The entire differential in pay in the periods before 
and after the wage review in 1998 was due to differences in returns to characteristics 
with returns to characteristics of employees in the private sector leading in the period 
before the wage review (Table 8) while the returns to characteristics of public sector 
were higher than those of their private sector counterparts in the period after the wage 
review (see Tables 6 and 7).
Assuming that there was not much difference between the public and private sector 
pay shortly after the increase in public sector pay in January 1993, one basic conclusion 
that can be drawn from the small size of the differential in public–private sector pay 
before the wage review in 1998 is that private sector pay must have registered a paltry 
rate of increase given the fact that public sector pay recorded zero increase during the 
period. The general lull in business activity during this period in Nigeria may provide 
some explanation for the small rate of increase in private sector pay. Another probable 
factor for the state of private sector pay during this period is that the public sector pay 
structure seems to dictate to a certain extent what happens to comparable private sector 
pay structures, or any other pay structures for that matter, in the Nigerian labour market. 
This can be deduced from the descriptive statistics (which relate to the periods before 
and after wage review) presented earlier for the entire labour force.
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10. Summary of findings and 
conclusion
T
his study investigated the impact of the government wage review in 1998 on the   
pubic–private sector wage differential in Nigeria. The investigation was based   
on urban male employees in the public and private sectors. The study found 
that before the wage review, public sector employees had a pay disadvantage of 6.78%. 
This meagre differential in public–private sector pay in the face of the stagnation that 
permeated the public sector pay levels for a long time before the wage review may be 
explained first by the downturn in business activity. This downturn could have limited 
private sector pay increases, and may be explained by the seemingly effective impact of 
the current public sector pay on private sector and other pay structures in the Nigerian 
labour market. The study also found that after the wage review, public sector employees 
were better remunerated (to the tune of 35.07%) than their private sector counterparts.
While the whole gamut of the pay disadvantage in the public sector before the wage 
review was mainly due to returns to employees’ human capital characteristics, the pay 
advantage that characterized the public sector pay structure after the wage review was 
equally traceable (in its entirety) to the returns to human capital characteristics of public 
sector workers. The government pay review therefore addressed, to some extent, the 
ostensibly poor public sector pay that prevailed before September 1998.
There is still much to be done to redress at least the real public sector pay after the 
1998 wage review, as its level (when measured by the state of real minimum wage) is 
still below what obtained in 1982 when the nation’s economy started to register profound 
declines in key macroeconomic indicators following the collapse in the prices of crude 
oil exports (see Appendix 2).
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Notes
1.  See Ojo (1998) for evidence of the brain drain from the public to the private sector during 
period before 1998.
2.  Newspaper reports indicate that there were some running crises between most state 
governments and their workers’ unions over the non-implementation of the wage review in 
its entirety in the last months of 1998 and in the early part of 1999  The state governments 
complained of lack of funds to implement fully the requirements of the 1998 wage review/
directive (The Punch, 6 October 1998, pp.1–2; Business Times, 12 October 1998; Nigerian 
Tribune, 10 November 1998; The Punch, 12 January 1999; The Guardian, 23 February 
1999, pp.1–2; Nigerian Tribune 26 April 1999). This author has no knowledge of any 
study conducted on the compliance level of formal private sector employers to any public 
sector-mandated wage review/directive in Nigeria.
3.  The classifications adopted here are based on the survey instrument used by the Federal 
Office of Statistics (in Nigeria) to collect household data under its General Household 
Survey. In Part B of the instrument, the six categories of respondents are identified.
4.  The real minimum wage rose dramatically during the periods of wage reviews (see 
Appendix 2). This implies that all other levels of pay (in real terms) in the public sector 
might have registered some increases.
5.  See Fapohunda (1979), Anyanwu et al. (1997) and The Guardian, 1 May 2000, pp.1–2.
6.  The second last Commission was set up to provide information on pay disparities within 
the public and the private sectors and between these two sectors. The panel/commission 
report was submitted in February 2006. The last panel was set up in December 2005 
and, as at the time of writing this study, was still conducting a nationwide tour to collate 
people’s views on the consolidation of benefits in the public service.
7.  The federal government discontinued this policy of backdating wage increases in the past 
two decades, perhaps on account of the fiscal and inflationary implications.
8.  See New Nigerian (daily newspaper) of 25 April 1987.
9.  Other policy measures taken during 1992 in particular included a waiver of import duty 
on transport vehicles and their spare parts to help bring down the cost of transportation 
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10.  Among the states are: Ogun, N6,500 (The Punch, 17 August 2000); Imo, N6,000 (The 
Punch, 18 August 2000); Ondo, N6,500 (The Guardian, 11 August 2000);  Ebonyi, N6,500 
(The Punch, 11 August 2000); Oyo, N6,500 (The Punch, 14 August 2000); Taraba, N6,500 
(The Punch, 15 August 2000); Ekiti, N6,000 (The Guardian, 4 August 2000); Edo, N6,500 
(The Comet,  4 September 2000); Enugu, N6,000 (The Punch, 3 August 2000); Bayelsa, 
N7,500 (The Guardian, 30 May 2000); Rivers, N7,500 (The Guardian, 6 June 2000); Abia, 
N6,000 (The Guardian, 3 July 2000); and Kaduna, N5,600 (The Guardian, 29 June 2000). 
These sources are daily newspapers and the relevant sections are the ones on minimum 
wage. There are 36 states in Nigeria.
11.  This was to some extent due to the structural adjustment policies introduced in Nigeria in 
the second half of the period. The policies sought (among others) to hold down the public 
sector wage bill (which was operationalized by freezing public sector workers’ pay) to 
achieve fiscal viability (see World Bank, 1994).
12.  The Mincerian approach/equation is based on the assumption that wages are set equal to 
the marginal productivity of the wage earners.
13.  The derivation of the lambda variable (l), which is referred to as the inverse Mill’s ratio, 
follows the two-step procedure of Lee (1983). The formula for lambda is: lij = j (Q-1[Pij])/
Pij. Where j (Ö) refers to the standard normal density function, while Q(Ö) relates to the 
cumulative distribution function. Pij is the predicted probability of observing individual i 
in sector j as obtained in the multinomial logit model (which in this study is the estimated 
multinomial logit model before we obtain the relative risk ratios [exponentiated multinomial 
logit model’s coefficients]).
14.  In similar studies (such as Glick and Sahn, 1997) a variable that is often used together 
with demographic characteristics of a household/individual is non-labour income. In the 
four data sets used in this study there is, however, no information on non-labour income 
of households/individuals. We have used the home ownership variable instead.
15.  This study used Stata Version 8 (a statistical and econometric software) to carry out all 
the regression analyses and some aspects of the data preparation in this study.
16.  See Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Account for 1998. The 
section on fiscal matters contains the information on the 28% drop recorded in oil export 
revenue.
17.  See van der Gaag, Stelcner and Vijverberg (1989) for a review of similar studies on 
developing countries that used samples of male employees.
18.  See Ojo (1998) for the evidence of brain drain from the public to the private sector during 
period before 1998.
19.  This is determined by the signs assumed by the z-scores attached to the odd ratios. The 
figures in brackets below the odd ratios are z-scores.34 r e S e a r c h  Pa P e r  223
20.  Of special significance is the negative sign that characterizes the underlying coefficients 
of the household size variable in seven of the 10 equations, which makes the variable a 
good indicator of resources. This has been described as a reflection of the endogeneity 
of household formation in which some unemployed family members are attracted to 
households where they can be taken care of from the resources (income) of household 
members who are employed (see Hofmeyr, 2002). This seems to reflect what obtains in 
reality as virtually every household in Nigeria has one or more unemployed members to 
cater for.
21.  Glick and Sahn (1997) encounter the same problem of wrong signs on education variables 
in a similar study on Guinean data. They explain that such a problem reflects collinearity 
of the education covariates with the selectivity term and this, they argue, suggests that the 
equation concerned is not properly identified. Similar results of negative coefficients for 
education variables were obtained by Appleton et al. (1999) in their study on the gender 
wage gap in three African countries (Côte D’Ivoire, Ethiopia and Uganda).
22.  This finding fully portrays what happened in reality, as the September 1998 wage review 
in the public sector resulted in larger increases in the wages of lower cadre workers than 
for higher cadre workers.
23.  This is arrived at by adding the second term on the right-hand side of the Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition with the differential in constant/intercept terms of the estimated wage 
equations.
24.  The following Oaxaca decomposition (see Oaxaca, 1973) is used in this study:
  i. lnWh- lnWL =  βh(Hh- HL) + HL(βh-βL)
  where lnWh 
  and  lnWL are the predicted means of log earnings. The subscript h refers to the higher 
predicted mean of log earnings while the subscript L relates to the lower predicted mean 
of log earnings. Parameters βh and βL are the estimated parameters for the sectors with the 
higher and lower predicted means of log earnings respectively. Hh and HL represent the 
means of the human capital and other variables in the sectors with the higher and lower 
predicted means of log earnings respectively.
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Nigeria’s real minimum wage and consumer price index (1974–2000)
Year  Real Minimum  Consumer 
  Wage (Naira)  Price Index
1974  387  15.5
1975  290  20.7
1976  239  25.1
1977  197  30.4
1978  174  34.5
1979  156  15.5
1980  142  42.4
1981  243  51.4
1982  227  55.1
1983  184  67.9
1984  131  95.6
1985  125  100
1986  119  105.4
1987  108  116.2
1988  69  181.2
1989  46  272.7
1990  43  293.2
1991  76  330.4
1992  52  478.4
1993  48  751.9
1994  31  1,180.7
1995  18  2,040.9
1996  14  2,638.1
1997  13  2,863.2
1998  37  3,149.2
1999  91  3,308.5
2000  136  3,421.4
Sources:  Federal Ministry of Finance. (1991); World Bank (1994); CBN (1998); CBN   
  (2000); The Guardian (2000); Federal Office of Statistics (2003);
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Appendix 2
Nigeria's real minimum wage (1974-2000)
1 The Federal Government discontinued this policy of backdating wage increases in the past two decades, 
perhaps on account of the fiscal and inflationary implications.
2 See New Nigerian (daily newpaper) of 25 April 1987.
3 Other policy measures taken in 1992 included a waiver of import duty on transport vehicles and their spare 
parts to bring down the cost of transportation for the people.
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